The Predictability Paradox: Arbitrators and Applicable Law by Park, William
Boston University School of Law
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
10-2014
The Predictability Paradox: Arbitrators and
Applicable Law
William Park
Boston University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Park, The Predictability Paradox: Arbitrators and Applicable Law, No. 14-55 Boston University School of Law, Public Law
Research Paper (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/97















g in 11 ICC
nnual Meeti

































































ml   
 
 




Forthcoming in 11 ICC DOSSIERS (ICC Institute of World Business Law 2014), Proceedings of 
Annual Meeting on International Arbitration and Substantive Applicable Law  
 
The Predictability Paradox: 
Arbitrators and Applicable Law 
 
William W. Park* 
 
 
I.  When Contract Terms Collide ................................................................................................ 1 
A.  Starting Points for Authority ............................................................................................ 1 
B.  Exculpatory Clauses and Arbitral Jurisdiction: An Illustrative Scenario ........................ 7 
C.  Tools for Interpretation .................................................................................................. 10 
II.  Knowing the Law .................................................................................................................. 11 
A.  Precedent and Policy ...................................................................................................... 11 
B.  Procedural Norms ........................................................................................................... 15 
III.  Adjusting the Contract ....................................................................................................... 17 
A.  Good Faith, Abus de droit, Treu und Glauben. .............................................................. 17 
B.  Modification Pursuant to Contract: Gas Price Adjustment ............................................ 22 
IV.  More Shades of Gray: Choice of Law and Transnational Norms ...................................... 25 
V.  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 27 
 
I. When Contract Terms Collide  
A. Starting Points for Authority 
More than a half century ago, a Hungarian psychoanalyst suggested terms to distinguish 
between thrill seekers and those who cling to the predictable: the ‘philobat’ who enjoys departing 
from the safe and predictable, and the ‘ocnophile’ who clings to stability.1 The latter category 
includes the risk averse (or just plain prudent) individuals who accept the prospect of being up 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston University; President, London Court of International Arbitration; 
General Editor, Arbitration International.  Copyright © William W. Park 2014. 
1 Michael Balint, Thrills and Regressions (1959). Balint coined the first term as a variant of 
acrobat, one who walks away from the safe earth, and the second from the Greek root ocno in the 
verb “to cling” or “to hesitate”. Id. at 25. Popularized explorations of the thesis appeared in 
Daniel Goleman, ‘Saying Goodbye Speaks Volumes’, New York Times (3 April 1984); Daniel 
Goleman, ‘Leaving’, International Herald Tribune, 7-8 April 1984, at 18.   




only one dollar (rather than two) in order to attenuate the possibility of having nothing at all.2   
Much of the impulse to arbitrate international disputes might be explained as a response 
to specters of uncertainty, whether lying in the ‘hometown justice’ of another country’s judicial 
system, or the perceived volatility of a civil jury in a faraway land. In the face of such 
hesitations, arbitration has been pressed into service to create more level litigation playing fields 
and to reduce the risk of random results.3 The inclination toward certainty and reliability might 
also explain differences in how arbitrators and judges approach application of national law.4 
Although perceptions exist in some quarters that arbitrators may be less reliable than judges in 
applying the law, the opposite may be true.  
This gap between reality and perception arises in part because of oft-repeated contentions 
                                                 
2 To illustrate the point, a group of students might be asked whether they would work as research 
assistant for the professor. If the majority raises their hands to signify interest, a quite different 
response would be expected to a counter-proposal that payment be deferred to the end of the 
academic year when a coin toss would determine whether they received, in the alternative, 
double compensation or no payment at all.  
3 Those engaged in international transactions tend to think in relative terms, with a rule deemed 
reliable if it reduces the likelihood of alternate outcomes, not because it operates with perfect 
foreseeability. Any legal system may, on some issues, work to one side’s disadvantage in a 
particular case. However, an agreement to ‘play by the rules’ of a relatively evolved system of 
law in a neutral forum will normally maximize both parties’ ex ante expectation of fair treatment. 
See William W. Park, ‘Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation’, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 12 (No. 4), 1995, page 99; Arbitration of International Business 
Disputes (2d Ed. 2012), chapter III-B-2, Ch.II-A-2; ‘Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of 
Rules and the Risks of Discretion (The 2002 Freshfields Lecture)’, Arbitration International, 19, 
2003, page 279. 
4 For a general overview of how arbitrators’ interpretation of contract overlaps with their 
construction of applicable law, see Laurent Lévy & Fabrice Robert-Tissot, L’interprétation 
arbitrale, 2013 (no. 4) Rev. de l’arbitrage 861. The authors compare commercial, sport and 
investor-state arbitration. Their conclusions suggest, inter alia, that for international commercial 
transactions, arbitrators tend to put more emphasis on the terms of the contract itself than on 




that arbitrators ‘split the baby’ through awards not justified in law.5 Certain strains of literature 
assert, without any real substantiation, that arbitrators render unprincipled decisions in order to 
attract business through reappointment.6 In fact, no empirical data permits a conclusion on the 
matter, at least not from variations in records of ‘win rates’ to the extent they can be determined 
or the size of damages in arbitration as opposed to court litigation.7  
Just as significantly, the greater reliability often found in arbitral awards, as contrasted 
with court judgments, derives from different notions of ‘law’ in commercial transactions. The 
calculus of duty is simply not the same as between judge and arbitrator. Bearing obligations to 
the citizenry as a whole, judges may seek to implement societal values that sometimes trump 
private agreements. Although responsible judges will master existing authority before taking the 
law in new directions, many traditions allow appellate judges to overrule precedent. In some 
legal systems, judicial policy predispositions have led political scientists to engage in intricate 
                                                 
5 The imagery of baby-splitting seems to originate in the Biblical child custody dispute decided 
in ancient Jerusalem by King Solomon. When one woman accused another of stealing her baby, 
the King called for a sword so the child might be divided in two, with one half for each woman. 
Of course, the metaphor hides the character of Solomon’s decision as an interim award, followed 
by grant of custody to the real mother whose compassion led to abandonment of her claim in 
hopes of saving her son. 1 Kings 3:23–28. 
6 See e.g., Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), at 127–128, stating that courts and 
juries are “more likely to adhere to the law and less likely than arbitrators to ‘split the difference’ 
between the two sides thereby lowering damages.” As authority for this sweeping assertion, 
Judge Posner simply quotes a California state case, Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare 
Services, 6 P.3d 669, 693 (Cal. 2000).  
7 See e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk, ‘The Repeat Appointment Factor,’ 96 Cornell Law Review, 47 
(2010), analyzing 131 ICSID cases implicating almost 200 arbitrators, refuting the oft-bandied 
suggestion that arbitrators either act in a biased way (to please appointers) or render decisions 
giving each party a partial victory to increase user satisfaction. The author suggests that an 
arbitrator’s incentive to maintain a reputation for independence and credibility trumps any 
temptation to act in an inappropriate way. See also Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, 
Arbitration & Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RES. J. 44 





charting of ideology in court judgments.8 
No similar social engineering usually falls to arbitrators. As creatures of the parties’ 
consent, arbitrators must show special fidelity to shared expectations expressed in contract or 
treaty, fixing their eyes on existing norms rather than proposals for the law as it should be.  
This ‘predictability paradox’ often demonstrates itself when relatively clear and specific 
contract language competes with more general provisions of national law. In such instances, 
arbitrators in international cases may show a heightened sensitivity toward the predictability of 
contract terms. Although sensitive to public values, rejecting complicity with illicit schemes and 
abusive procedures, arbitrators fix their eyes more on existing legal norms, asking what the 
parties had a right to expect. When interpreting the law, arbitrators may be more inclined to take 
statutes and cases as they are, rather than considering public policies that justify shaping or 
stretching norms to meet new social or economic challenges.  
On occasion, the nature of the judicial office may include a perceived institutional duty to 
embrace public interests of the forum, or a political inclination to develop the law in light of 
evolving national concerns of a social or economic nature.9 In a dispute over the price of oil, a 
                                                 
8 See e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002). The so-called ‘Martin-Quinn Scores’ use a scale with 
negative numbers translating to liberalism and positive numbers translating to conservatism. 
Thus Justice Douglas, considered a very liberal judge, received an average ideological score of 
minus 4, while a score of positive 4.30 was accorded the conservative Justice Rehnquist. See 
generally, Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, Lee Epstein, ‘The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’, North Carolina Law Review, 83, 2005, page 1275; Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Kevin 
Quinn & Jeffrey Segal, ‘Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When and How 
Important’, Northwestern University Law Review, 101, 2007, page 1483; Lee Epstein, Tonja 
Jacobi, ‘Super Medians’, Stanford Law Review, 61, 2008, page 37, 99.  
9 Contemplating competing loyalties of both judges and arbitrators, one recalls without comment 
the lines in the Sermon on the Mount: “No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one 




judge in a fuel-importing jurisdiction like Massachusetts could be expected to consider payments 
by local residents during the bitter cold New England winters.10 By contrast, arguments for lower 
fuel costs might be received with greater skepticism by judges from oil producing countries like 
Venezuela.  
Of course, personal sympathies can play a role for both arbitrators and judges.11 For the 
disciplined arbitrator, however, whether from Boston or from Caracas, the duty toward the 
contracting parties and the correct interpretation of their agreement will tend to manifest itself in 
a heightened fidelity to the parties’ shared ex ante expectations, and thus predictable vindication 
of contract rights.12  
Such variations in the approaches of arbitrator and judge tend to be linked to their 
respective sources of authority. The genesis of judicial power normally lies in the political 
collectivity that appoints the judge and pays his or her salary.  
                                                 
10 On occasion, it has been argued that public interests come into play more for investor-state 
arbitration than for commercial disputes. On reflection, however, contract disputes affect the 
world’s aggregate social and economic welfare no less than investment treaty controversies. If 
the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates anything, it teaches that private choices have public 
consequences. To some extent, the debate may be about terminology. See e.g. ‘Theory and 
Reality of the Arbitrator’, World Arbitration & Mediation Review, 7, 2013, pages 629-649, 
including proceedings of the 25th Annual Institution for Transnational Arbitration in Dallas in 
June 2013. In response to suggestions that both commercial and investor-state arbitration affect 
public interest, Professor Brigitte Stern replied that commercial cases have “an impact on public 
interest” whereas “investment arbitration is completely different because the public interest is 
part of an element of the award.” Id. at 642.  
11 See e.g., Edna Sussman, ‘Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological Influences 
and What You can Do About Them’, American Review of International Arbitration, 24, 2013, at 
page 487. 
12 For a broader treatment of what has been called arbitration’s ‘ambivalence toward law’ see Jan 




By contrast, the arbitrator’s legitimacy starts with an agreement to waive recourse to 
otherwise competent national courts.13 At least as to the merits of a dispute, arbitration clauses 
will normally be construed as a renunciation of judicial decision-making.  Such waivers are 
usually created either by private contracts or through government-to-government treaties.14   
To some extent, this paradox rests on contrasting notions of predictability, opposing 
contract provisions against notions of the ‘right’ as perceived in the forum community. The 
arbitrator may look to enhance shared ex ante expectations of the parties themselves, applying 
the law on an ‘as is’ basis. By contrast, appellate judge might explore principles that push law 
into new directions, so as to promote certainty from the perspective of emerging policy.15  
In an international context, bias and fairness often appear as opposite sides of the same 
coin. The party for which a rule creates commercial disadvantage will welcome a softening of 
that rule’s rigor by a judge in its home forum. By contrast, the foreign side might perceive failure 
to enforce the bargain as simply xenophobic prejudice.  
                                                 
13 As suggested by Professor Pierre Mayer, constraints on the international arbitrator derive from 
“the will of the parties, the jurisdictional nature of the arbitral function, and in modern legal 
systems only minimally from mandates at the arbitral seat.” Pierre Mayer, ‘La liberté de 
l’arbitre’, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2, 2013, page 340. In the original, “[Les contraintes sur 
l’arbitre] tiennent à la volonté des parties, à la nature juridictionnelle de sa fonction et, dans les 
législations modernes, seulement dans une faible mesure à certains impératifs émanant de l’Etat 
du siège.” 
14 This does not mean, of course that courts fail to play a role in monitoring the arbitration 
process, particularly in connection with the contours of arbitral authority.  See e.g., George 
Bermann, ‘The ‘Gateway Problem’ in International Commercial Arbitration’, Yale Journal of 
International Law, 37, 2012, at 1; William W. Park, Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, 13 
ICCA Congress Series 55 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, 2007).  Some legal 
systems maintain a right of appeal on the legal merits, as for example Section 69 of the 1996 
English Arbitration Act. 
15 For example, applicable law might say that fraud in sales contract gives a buyer the right to 
rescind, but not to seek damages that could in essence be characterized as a price renegotiation.  
A judge might consider the rule outmoded, and give buyers new rights, whereas the arbitrator 




Imagine, for example, that a gas supply agreement between an Algerian state agency and 
a Boston importer operates to the disadvantage of the American buyer. A court judgment 
refusing to enforce certain aspects of the contractual arrangements might appear as promoting 
community interests in Massachusetts. From the perspective of the Algerian seller, however, the 
judicial decision would likely seem to be simply a way to ignore the parties’ freely accepted 
agreement to enhance post-dispute local interests.16  
B. Exculpatory Clauses and Arbitral Jurisdiction: An Illustrative Scenario 
As between judge and arbitrator, different results arise most pointedly when express terms of 
an agreement appear to conflict with mandates of the contractually chosen law. For example, an 
international sales contract contains explicit language providing that neither side shall be liable 
in damages for negligence, including gross negligence. The contract’s clear exculpatory 
language has been reinforced by an unequivocal arbitration clause stating that the arbitrator has 
no authority to award damages for negligence of any kind. However, the contract also provides 
for its interpretation according to the law of a third-country legal system not that of either party, 
which invalidates any purported contractual exclusion of responsibility for gross negligence.  
What should happen if one side claims damages for gross negligence? A judge in Geneva or 
Boston would normally interpret such exculpatory language under the law of Switzerland or 
Massachusetts, each of which invalidates such exculpatory clauses.17 Absent a choice-of-law rule 
                                                 
16 See e.g., Sonatrach v. Distrigas, 80 Bankr. 606 (D. Mass. 1987). In reversing a lower court 
decision which, at the request of the Massachusetts importer, had denied enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement invoked by the Algerian seller, the Federal District Court for 
Massachusetts opinioned, “It is important and necessary for the United States to hold its 
domiciliaries to their bargains and not allow them to escape their commercial obligations by 
ducking into statutory safe harbors.” Id. at 614.  
17 Swiss Code des Obligations (Book V, Code Civil), Art. 100(1): “Est nulle toute stipulation 





directing a different result, courts would be hard pressed not to disregard the damages limits 
given that the state creating their authority outlawed the restrictions.  
By contrast, an arbitrator might accord more deference the contract terms as indicative of 
party-imposed limitations on arbitral jurisdiction. Specific stipulations usually trump more 
general principles.18 The exclusion of jurisdiction with respect to negligence damages would at 
first blush seem narrower and more specific than a general reference to an applicable law. Thus 
the arbitrator might decide that the litigants intended the chosen law (Massachusetts or 
Switzerland) to fill gaps, but not to contradict explicit contract restrictions on arbitral authority. 
The arbitrator’s authority to apply an applicable law comes into play by virtue of the parties’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
faute grave.” (Any agreement purporting to exclude in advance liability for willful blindness or 
gross negligence is void.) See also Zavras v. Capeway Rovers Motorcycle Club, 687 N.E.2d 
1263, 1265 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). A rider was injured while competing in a motorcycle race, 
crashing at a jump without knowing that a previous accident had created a pile-up in the landing 
zone. The motorcycle club allegedly employed a flagman who failed properly to warn of the 
pile-up. Although the rider agreed in writing to hold the club blameless for any loss or injury, the 
court found gross negligence cannot be waived.  
18 For a broader musing on the benefits of specific as contrasted with general rules, see Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHICAGO LAW REV. 1175 (1989), contrasting 
rules of law with personal discretion to do justice, the latter having been exemplified in the fair 
and even-handed decisions dispensed by King Louis IX of France sitting under his proverbial 




agreement, rather than the mandates of a forum imposing itself sua sponte.19 Moreover, an award 
that disregards the exclusion of liability could result in annulment for excess of jurisdiction.20  
Of course, good arbitrators avoid any simplistic vision of the parties’ intent that gives a 
priori precedence to either substantive contract terms or a choice of otherwise applicable legal 
principles. In some instances, seeming inconsistencies may, on deeper reflection, reveal 
themselves as false conflicts.21 The devil remains very much in the details of each case. 
For international cases, the lodestar of party intent can prove particularly elusive. A 
contract between Finns and Turks might be drafted in English, not the mother tongue of either 
side’s business managers. The agreement might then be subject to the law of Switzerland simply 
for ‘neutrality’ reasons, although the transaction had no connection with the Helvetic 
Confederation. The choice of law clause may have been inserted about 2:18am, at the end of 
long negotiations when the main business points of price and delivery had been agreed, leaving 
                                                 
19 Such an illustration assumes of course that the contract terms do not run afoul of mandatory 
norms at the place of performance, often called ‘lois de police’ by Continental scholars. See 
Pierre Mayer, ‘L’arbitre international et la hiérarchie des norms’, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2, 2011, 
page 361. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (U.S. 
1985), the Supreme Court stated “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for 
antitrust violations, [it] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against 
public policy.”  
20 One can only speculate about the fate of separate negligence claims brought in court following 
an arbitrator’s decision that such damages lie outside arbitral competence.  
21 In many instances, of course, waivers remain compatible with applicable law. For example, the 
law of New York provides that a contracting party may explicitly disclaim reliance on any 
statements or nondisclosures, albeit with an exception related to “facts allegedly misrepresented 
[that lie] peculiarly within the seller’s knowledge.” See Manu. Hanover Trust v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 
310 (2d. Cir. 1993); DIMON Inc. v. Folium, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 359, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Bank of Can., 28 Misc. 3d 1225(A), 1225A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). An 
arbitrator considering a fraud defense with respect to a contract governed by New York law 
would normally take into account not only the waivers, but also arguments about the ‘peculiar 




drafting teams with little time to study what the Swiss law might say about a potentially 
controverted matter.22 
Finally, the matter of arbitration language injects another significant difference between 
the arbitrator and the national judge in an international context. In addition to the words used in 
presenting argument and evidence, language can also affect the procedural framework of a case. 
For example, testimony might be heard in French, but in an arbitration built on the procedural 
language of American practice dominated by document production unknown in the French legal 
system. Moreover, words such as ‘witness’ and ‘témoin’ may prove false friends if evidence is 
presented by a party’s employee, lacking capacity to testify under French legal concepts.23 
C. Tools for Interpretation  
In many instances of course judicial and arbitral interpretation will run along similar lines, 
most notably when law serves to assist contract construction by providing hermeneutic tools. 
Divergence between judge and arbitrator will be less likely when the law serves merely to 
provide interpretative or exegetical principles.   
                                                 
22 The construction exercise becomes more complex if the parties choose to import only part of a 
third country law. For example, English and Belgian companies might stipulate to contract 
interpretation under Book V of the Swiss Civil Code, the ‘Code of Obligations’ governing 
commercial matters. Difficult questions arise if arbitrators applying that choice of laws clause 
receive an application to adapt contract terms pursuant to Book I of the Civil Code, containing 
the well-known Article 2 on good faith and abuse of rights. Depending on context, an argument 
can be made that explicit choice of Book V alone serves to exclude other parts of Swiss law. 
23 See Yves Derains, ‘Langue et langages de l’arbitrage’, Mélanges en l’Honneur de Pierre 
Tercier 789 (P. Guach, F. Werro, & P. Pichonnaz, eds., 2008). Compare Pierre A Karrer, 
‘Arbitration and Language: Look for Purpose’, 11 Croatian Arbitration Yearbook 7 (Zagreb 
2004), addressing matters such as the language use for taking evidence and the risks of 
mistranslation. See also Nicolas C. Ulmer, ‘Language Truth and Arbitral Accuracy’, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 28, 2011, at page 285. For a somewhat broader take on the interaction 
of language and interpretation of legal texts, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, ‘Is That 
English You’re Speaking? Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility’, San Diego Law 




Imagine for example that a manufacturer seeks to end a distributorship on the basis that 
products were late getting to customers. The distributor contends that since contract inception, a 
two-week delivery practice been deemed reasonable, with recent insistence on shorter periods 
serving as mere pretext for unauthorized termination.  
At least in some contexts, New York law provides that post-contract behavior may serve to 
inform understanding in the meaning of contract terms. For example, when a sales contract 
involves repeated occasions for performance, with knowledge of the nature of the performance 
and the opportunity for objections, any such course of performance “accepted or acquiesced in 
without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.”24 
Regardless of where they might be sitting, conscientious arbitrators, construing a contract 
pursuant to New York law, would normally take account of a course of performance, just as 
would New York judges. The chosen law serves as an instrument for exegesis of the contract 
terms, not as a source of independent duties. 
II. Knowing the Law  
A. Precedent and Policy 
Application of the law by arbitrators and judges often occurs in the shadow of divergent 
ways that law may be known,25 proved,26 or in some instances presumed.27 In theory no law will 
                                                 
24 See UCC Section 2-208(1) as enacted in New York.  
25 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Iura Novit Arbiter: Est-ce bien raisonnable? Réflexions sur 
le statut du droit de fond devant l’arbitre international’, in De Lege Ferenda: Etudes pour le 
professeur Alain Hirsch 71 (A. Héritier Lachat & L. Hirsch, eds., 2004); Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, ‘The Arbitrator and the Law’, Arbitration International, 21, 2005, page 631; Julian D. 
M. Lew, ‘Proof of Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration’, in Festschrift für 
Otto Sandrock 581 (K. P. Berger, W. F. Ebke, S. Elsing, B. Grossfeld, & G. Kühne, eds., 2000). 
26 Although judges are often presumed to know the law under the principle of jura novit curia, 





be ‘foreign’ to an international tribunal. In practice, however, the applicable law may be 
unfamiliar to some members of the tribunal, who may need to be instructed by experts.28     
Normally, the process for such instruction might take the form of testimony from learned 
professors or practitioners, presented by each side. In some instances, the arbitrators will engage 
in direct study of legal authorities and theories. This does not mean that an arbitrator’s 
conclusions should contain surprises from such self-instruction. Providing an opportunity for the 
litigants to comment on the law remains vital both to the arbitrator getting it right and to the 
parties’ sense of being treated justly. 29  
                                                                                                                                                             
Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Lawrence Collins, Gen. Ed., 14th ed. 2006), Chapter 9 
pages 255 et seq.) while in the United States Rule 44.1 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that courts in determining foreign law “may consider any relevant material or 
source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.” Similar state law principles include New York CPLR § 4511 and 
Massachusetts GL Ch. 233, § 70, directing courts to take judicial notice of foreign law. 
27 Instances where eminent judges and arbitrators simply presume a conclusion are not hard to 
find. See Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 1, 1952, page 247, where Lord Asquith of 
Bishopstone admitted that the applicable system of law was prima facie that of Abu Dhabi, then 
added, “But no such law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh administers a purely 
discretionary justice with assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this 
very primitive region there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction 
of modern commercial instruments.” See generally, Ibrahim Fadlallah, ‘Arbitration Facing 
Conflicts of Culture’, Arbitration International, 25, 2009, page 303. 
28 In a dispute between a Chinese state entity and an investor from the United States, with the 
contract subject to the law of China, the American party might appoint as arbitrator a New York 
trained lawyer who would sit with a Chinese jurist appointed by the state entity, and a third-
country national as chair. 
29 The rule that parties must have a chance to comment on applicable law was explored inter alia 
by the highest court in France in Commercial Caribbean Niquel v. La Société Overseas Mining 
Investments, Arrêt No. 785, 29 June 2011, Court de Cassation, Première chambre civile, 
rejecting challenge to the decision of the Cour d’appel de Paris, ch. 1, 25 March 2010, discussed 
in Seranglini, La Semaine Juridique Ed. G., No. 23, 7 juin 2010. The case addresses an award 
based on a damages theory of ‘lost change’ rather than ‘lost profits’ in mining ventures. See 
generally, William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes (2d Ed. 2012), 




Notions of precedent play themselves out differently in arbitration as contrasted with 
court litigation. Within a single national jurisdiction, a measure of uniformity can be imposed on 
courts from the top down. One case furnishes authority for decisions in similar fact patterns with 
similar questions of law. Although in theory Continental and ‘common law’ traditions take 
divergent views of precedent, with the former giving lower courts considerable autonomy to 
interpret legal texts de novo,30 in practice Continental judges remain mindful of higher court 
decisions.31  
By contrast, absent res judicata or issue preclusion arising for the same parties and the 
same claims or issues,32 arbitrators do not usually deem themselves bound by rulings of other 
tribunals in the way judges feel constrained by decisions of superior courts in a unified and 
hierarchical national system. 
This does not mean that prior awards will be ignored. To the contrary, decisions of other 
arbitral tribunals are often taken into account as constituting a corpus of principles representing 
the litigants’ shared expectations. While not given the status of precedent in a narrow common 
                                                 
30 Article 5 of French Code civil forbids judges from purporting to make general rules: Il est 
défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes 
qui leur sont soumises. A similar principle applies in Germany. See Klaus-Peter Berger, ‘To 
What Extent Should Arbitrators Respect Domestic Law? The German Experience Regarding the 
Law on Standard Terms’, forthcoming in Arbitration International, 30, 2014, looking inter alia 
at application of German case law relating to limitation of liability (‘cap’) clause in standard 
form agreements. 
31 See generally, Denis Tallon, ‘Précedent’, in Dictionnaire de la Culture Juridique 1185-1187 
(2003).   
32 While res judicata prevents the same parties from re-litigating the same cause of action after it 
has already been adjudicated in an earlier lawsuit, notions of issue preclusion come into play 
when a second but different lawsuit implicates questions decided in a prior action, the re-
litigation of which questions is then barred. French doctrines of force de chose jugée and German 





law sense, awards of respected arbitrators may bolster support for results in other cases,33 
providing information about what the relevant community considers the right approach to similar 
problems.34 For litigants, this information can serve as a tool of persuasion. For business 
managers and government planners, it provides one way to predict how future disputes will be 
resolved. And for the arbitrators, prior rulings can justify awards to the rest of the world and 
enhance the prospect that similar cases will be treated similarly.35  
Finally, the relationship between questions of law and fact remains slippery in any 
context,36 and may prove a challenge to judges and arbitrators alike. Controverted facts can 
                                                 
33 One authority has suggested that for international arbitration precedent exists as “decisional 
authority that may reasonably serve to justify the arbitrators’ decision to the principal audience 
for that decision.” Barton Legum, ‘Definitions of Precedent in International Arbitration’, in 
Precedent in International Arbitration (E. Gaillard & Y. Banifatemi, eds. 2008) 5, 14.  
34 For an illustration of the delicate ambivalence arbitrators feel about prior awards, see AES 
Corporation v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 30 (Jul. 13, 2005), which asserts that each arbitral tribunal “remains sovereign and may retain, 
as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem...” 
Following a semicolon, the sentence then adds that decisions “dealing with the same or very 
similar issues may at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest; this Tribunal may 
consider them in order to compare its own position with those already adopted by its 
predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by one or more of these tribunals on a 
specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution.” Id., page 11. 
35 For investor-state treaty disputes, jurisdictional questions such as ‘most-favored nation’ prove 
fertile sources for de facto precedent. See Tai-Heng Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’, Fordham International Law Journal, 30, 2007; Jeffrey P. 
Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, Journal of International Arbitration, 
24(2), 2007, page 129. Precedent is also common in ‘trade arbitration’ (maritime, commodities 
and reinsurance). See Michael Marks Cohen, Letter, 10 (No. 2) INT’L ARB Q. L. REV 113 
(Summer 2009).  
36 In Vargas v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1981), an aviation policy 
covered accidents “within the United States of America.” The insured died while traveling 
between two points of the United States (New York and Puerto Rico), invoking a canon of 
construction requiring ambiguities to be resolved against the drafters (contra proferentem) that 
has since been excluded in many liability policies. See also Gerald Leonard, ‘Rape, Murder, and 
Formalism: What Happens When We Define Mistake of Law?’ University of Colorado Law 





remain stubbornly particular, requiring recourse to witnesses and exhibits, while the law by its 
nature possesses a generality that permits instruction by reading statutes and cases.37 
B. Procedural Norms 
In some instances, arbitrators must interpret and apply national law provisions imposing 
constraints on procedural matters, rather than substantive norms of contract construction. In that 
context, the duty of fidelity to the parties’ agreement may compete with the obligation to comply 
with mandatory procedures of the arbitral seat. Or the arbitrators may interpret national 
arbitration law in a way at odds with the view of the local judiciary.38  
The first dilemma (potential conflict between contract and procedural law) exemplifies 
itself in provisions English arbitration law invalidates pre-dispute agreements to allocate 
                                                                                                                                                             
defendant’s incorrect belief that a woman consented would be a defense, but not an incorrect 
understanding of the law. 
37 In a sense, we cannot say what the law is for a given dispute until first knowing what law is in 
general. One working definition articulates law as an authoritative dispute resolution process that 
includes principles for substantive conduct as well as procedures for deciding cases. 
Francophone jurists distinguish between ‘loi’ and ‘droit’ both of which are ‘law’ for the 
Anglophone. A tyrant’s statute (‘loi’) might be law in the sense of an enactment, while contrary 
to authoritative norms (‘droit’) recognized from a more legitimate vantage point. English King 
George III may have made such a distinction for laws of his rebellious American colonies, as did 
the colonists for some British taxes before 1776.  
38 In some instances the relevant legal provision might lie on the border of procedure and 
substance, to be called into question only in the event of perceived ambiguity in contract terms. 
See e.g., the exclusionary rule interpreted by the British House of Lords (as it then was) barring 
evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions that predates an agreement. See Investors 
Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society, [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 WLR 
896, [1997] UKHL 28, [1998] WLR 896; Chartbrook v. Persimmon Homes [2009] UKHL 38, 
paragraphs 41-42 as per Lord Hoffmann. Compare Article 1341 of the French Code civil which 
prohibits witness testimony to modify clear terms of a contract in the event of property 
conveyances made by notarial deed. For related French provisions on contract interpretation, see 




arbitration costs ‘in any event.’39 In advance of the dispute, parties may not by contract forbid an 
arbitrator from allocating costs on the basis of who won and who lost. The provision casts a wide 
net, catching even reasonable arrangements among sophisticated business managers to split 
arbitrator compensation on a 50/50 basis and to require each side to cover its own legal expenses.  
In such an instance, where the contract terms fix cost principles, what is to be done by a 
conscientious arbitrator? Aiming to respect the parties’ agreement, an arbitrator would let the 
costs lie where they fall. Yet to do so might run the risk of award annulment if proceedings are 
seated in London.   
To complicate matters, disregard of the parties’ ex ante expectations may appear as 
excess of authority to a New York court called to enforce an award of legal costs inconsistent 
with the terms of the agreement and the applicable law, putting the arbitrators between Scylla 
and Charybdis when the award must be enforced in a jurisdiction that values respect for the 
parties’ choices.40  
The second problem (possible tension between arbitral and judicial interpretations of 
procedural mandates) finds illustration in the vexing subject of “class arbitration” and supplies 
another dimension in the slippery task of interpreting national procedural law. The United States 
                                                 
39 Section 60, Arbitration Act of 1996: “An agreement which has the effect that a party is to pay 
the whole or part of the costs of the arbitration in any event is only valid if made after the dispute 
in question has arisen.” Section 61 goes on to set forth the general principle that “costs should 
follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not 
appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.” This standard, however, is made subject 
to the parties’ agreement otherwise, which in context with Section 60 would be an agreement 
after the dispute has arisen. The rule’s most understandable application would be as an anti-
abuse mechanism to prevent clauses that would require weaker parties to pay all costs, thus 
discouraging otherwise legitimate claims.   
40 The scenario of London arbitral situs with New York substantive law occurs frequently in 
contracts between American policyholders and British insurers, the so-called ‘Bermuda Form’ 
arbitrations discussed in Richard Jacobs, Lorelie S. Masters & Paul Stanley, Liability Insurance 




Supreme Court addressed the matter in an action arising from price-fixing allegations against 
ship owners brought by customers who chartered vessels commonly known as ‘Parcel Tankers’ 
to transport food oils and chemicals.41   
In connection with the customers’ request for a single arbitration proceeding (‘class 
arbitration’ borrowing language from American court procedures42), the arbitrators in a partial 
award interpreted both the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act to permit class arbitration. 
Ultimately a majority of the US Supreme Court held that the arbitrators had exceeded their 
authority. Rightly or wrong, the Court, divided sharply along political lines, found that the 
arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement followed personal policy views rather 
than the proper contours of the applicable arbitration law.43    
III. Adjusting the Contract  
A. Good Faith, ‘Abus de Droit’, ‘Treu und Glauben’ 
One little-explored area in which to examine the divergence between judge and arbitrator 
relates to provisions of national law that permit adjustment of the contract,44 most notably on a 
                                                 
41 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
42 Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a small number of plaintiffs is 
“certified” to represent a larger class of plaintiffs who have substantially similar claims, whether 
or not all members of the class participate in the matter.  
43 Some commentators consider that the Court, in its zeal to send a signal on the problematic 
nature of class arbitration, conflated the monitoring of arbitral jurisdiction (for courts) and 
deciding substantive merits of the parties’ dispute (for the arbitrators), giving the right answer to 
the wrong question. The relevant inquiry facing the Court was not, “What did the parties agree in 
general?” but the more limited issue, “What did the parties agree to arbitrate?” See William W. 
Park, ‘La jurisprudence américaine en matière de class arbitration: entre débat politique et 
technique juridique’, Revue de l’arbitrage, 3, 2012, page 507.  
44 For a comprehensive tour d’horizon of contract adjustment, see Joachim G. Frick, Arbitration 
and Complex International Contracts (Zürich 2001), Part III (at 145-226), addressing in 
particular the matter of ‘gap filling’ in complex agreements, adaptation clauses, the duty to 





theory such as ‘good faith’ and ‘abuse of rights’ (as in Switzerland)45 or notions such as Treu 
und Glauben (in Germany),46 force majeure and imprévision (in France).47 National legal 
systems speak of other notions such as impracticability, frustration and impossibility (in common 
law systems),48 excessiva onerosità (in Italy)49 and/or Wegfall der Geschäfsgrundlage.50 
Sometimes a duty to renegotiate might arguably exist under principles of international 
trade law (sometimes called lex mercatoria) in the case of substantial upheaval (bouleversement) 
                                                                                                                                                             
and lex mercatoria derived from arbitral awards. See also Nagla Nassan, Sanctity of Contract 
Revisited: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long Term International Commercial 
Transactions (1995). 
45 Article 2 of Swiss Code civil. Compare to Article 1134(3) of French Code civil, which speaks 
of abuse of contracts (conventions) rather than rights (droits), derived from the notion that 
contracts must be executed in good faith.  
46 German Civil Code (ZPO) in Section 162(2) provides inter alia, “If the satisfaction of a 
condition is brought about in bad faith by the party to whose advantage it would be, the condition 
is deemed not to have been satisfied.” (“Wird der Eintritt der Bedingung von der Partei, zu deren 
Vorteil er gereicht, wider Treu und Glauben herbeigeführt, so gilt der Eintritt als nicht erfolgt.”) 
See also Article 242, concerning the obligator’s duty to perform obligations according to the 
requirements of good faith, taking into account custom and practice. 
47 See e.g., French Code civil Article 1148 (force majeure as a defense to performance) and 
Article 1134(3), discussed supra, concerning the duty to execute contracts in good faith. 
48 See e.g., Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-615 (relieving performance made impracticable 
by an occurrence whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract) and Chitty on 
Contracts  (31st Ed. 2012), Chapter 23 (Discharge by Frustration). 
49 Italian Codice Civile, Articles 1467-68.  
50 See e.g., German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Article 275 (no claim for performance of an act 
which is impossible (unmöglich). Analogously, Article 79 of the Convention on International 
Sales of Goods dispenses with liability when failure of performance was due to “an impediment 
beyond [the non-performing party’s] control” which could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken into account at the time of contract conclusion. International lawyers often speak of rebus 
sic stantibus. See Article 62, Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, which addresses 
“Fundamental Change of Circumstances” and makes provision of a change whose effect is to 
“radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” See 
generally, Detlev Vagts, ‘Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law’, Columbia 




in the economic equilibrium between the two sides.51 Such principles may be found in narrow 
usages within a specific industry, or broader trade usages that have been incorporated into the 
UNIDROIT Principles promulgated by the Rome-based “International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law,”52 which attempt to suggest how commercial parties should react to 
dramatic and unforeseen circumstances that interfere with the performance of contract duties, 
either through excuse of performance, adaptation of the contract obligation, or a duty to 
renegotiate, failing which the contract terminates.53  
Judicial and arbitral attitudes need not diverge in applying such principles of good faith 
and abuse of rights. In some instances, different outcomes will result from a divergence in the 
decision-maker’s individual evaluation of the way changed circumstances should be addressed, 
regardless of whether the decision-maker is a judge or an arbitrator.  
Such differences should not seem odd, given that they occur equally within a single legal 
system, particularly through legal principles allowing adjustment of contract through ‘filling the 
                                                 
51 These principles may be invoked both on the basis of industry custom, for example as 
provided in French Code civil Article 1135 and ‘commercial usage’ (‘des usages du commerce’) 
in Article 1511 of the French Code de procédure civile as applied to international arbitration. 
Compare Articles 1135 and 1511 with Article 21 of the International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Rules (2012 Version), stipulating that the tribunal “shall take account of … any 
relevant trade usages.”  
52 Principles of International Commercial Contracts, issued first in 1994, then re-issued with 
modifications in 2004 and 2010. See also Commission on European Contract Law (‘Lando 
Principles’) chaired by Danish law Professor Ole Lando, presented in full in 1998.   
53 The UNIDROIT Principles contain a section on ‘Hardship’ defined to exist when events 
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract because the cost of performance has 
increased or the value received has diminished. The concept of hardship includes (inter alia) 
events that could not reasonably have been taken into account at the time of conclusion of the 
contract and whose risk was not assumed by the party. In the event of hardship the party may 
request renegotiation. On failure to reach an agreement a court may either (i) terminate the 
contract or (ii) “adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.” See UNIDROIT 




gaps’ on matters the parties did not initially consider. A case decided in 1935 by the highest 
court in Switzerland involved hydroelectric power sold by the commune of Zermatt to the 
Gornergrat Railroad.54 In 1895, a long-term concession for hydroelectric power had been granted 
to the railroad by the local municipality, or Gemeinde.  
Decades later, a question arose as to what should be done with surplus power, a matter 
left open when the contract was concluded. The Swiss federal and cantonal courts came to the 
conclusion that a judge could in essence create a new contract term, thereby permitting sale 
outside the territory of the municipality. However, the federal court disagreed sharply with the 
cantonal court on the specificity to be used in filling the gap, insisting on coming up with 
calculations based on kilowatt hours. 
Legal provisions that excuse performance or mandate adjustment of terms overlap with, 
but remain distinct from, provisions that permit arbitrators to disregard the strict rigors of 
otherwise applicable law on explicit authorization from the parties.55 Notions such as amiable 
composition describe a process whereby arbitrators temper legal rules whose application violates 
what seems right in the circumstances, for example due to substantial completion of a project, or 
                                                 
54 Gornergratbahn-Gesellschaft gegen Munizipal- und Burgergemeinde Zermatt, decision of 21 
March 1935 in ATF 61 I 65 – 79. Review by the Tribunal fédéral (Bundesgericht) of a decision 
by the cantonal court in Valais concerning the 99-year concession. Thanks to Michael Schneider 
for background on this case.  
55 See e.g., French Code de Procédure Civile, Article 1512, authorizing amiable composition in 
international arbitration if provided by the parties’ agreement. For international contracts, 
references to amiable composition may assume less precise contours than provided under French 
law, a bit as ‘due process’ has come to be used in arbitration without necessarily drawing its 
significance from U.S. law. French Code de Procédure Civile Article 1478 contains similar 




unexpected exchange rate modification.56 Rather than aiming at legal accuracy, the arbitrator 
reaches toward general notions of ‘right’ encrusted with emotional overtones and sometimes in 
tension with court decisions, statutes or strict contract terms.  
A long-standing debate surrounds whether amiable composition amounts to the same 
thing as decision-making ex aequo et bono, according to the ‘right and good’.57 While the 
notions are often used interchangeably, they may not be coextensive. Arbitrators who decide ex 
aequo et bono might begin and end with a private sense of justice, going directly to a personal 
view of the right result, while in amiable composition the arbitrators would start at rules of law, 
departing only if needed to achieve a just result.58 The difference is significant, given that there is 
nothing inherently unjust about most norms of commercial law.59  
                                                 
56 See Eric Loquin, L’amiable composition en droit comparé et international: Contribution à 
l'étude du non-droit dans l’arbitrage commercial (1980). See also, W. L. Craig, W. W. Park & J. 
Paulsson, ICC Arbitration (3rd Ed., 2000), §§3.05 at 110-114. 
57 The Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (in Article 21(3) of the 2012 
Rules) mention both amiable composition and ex aequo et bono, saying that a tribunal may (if 
authorized) “assume the powers of an amiable compositeur” or “decide ex aequo et bono.” The 
French version follows similar structure, with the disjunctive “or” leaving two distinct notions, 
as in “law or equity.”  The disjunctive “or” may suggest the notions remain separate, or may 
simply suggest different ways to express similar concepts. The Rules permit amiable 
composition and ex aequo et bono decision-making only if agreed by the parties. In accord with 
that principle, see Richard M. Mosk, ‘Arbitrators Should Apply the Law’, Los Angeles Daily 
Journal (19 April 2011) urging ex aequo decisions only with the express consent of the parties. 
58 Compare Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard, & Berthold Goldman, Traité de l’arbitrage 
commercial international (1996), Section 1502 at 836-37. The authors seem to admit the option 
either to proceed directly to justice or first to consider the applicable law. Nevertheless, they 
suggest that such a nuance lacks significance (“une telle distinction … paraît artificielle”) 
because the arbitrators can always do what they think justice requires. 
59 The meaning and availability of such principles remain distinct from the question of whether it 
would be wise for contracting parties to agree to such flexibility. With respect to the substance of 
many economic transactions, such as a seller’s right to be paid or the insured’s right to be 
reimbursed, the slim objective content of notions such as fairness may make the concept 
problematic. Legal rules permit individuals, companies and governments to evaluate risks and 





B. Modification Pursuant to Contract: Gas Price Adjustment 
An intriguing comparison between judge and arbitrator might be found in adjustment of 
agreements pursuant to explicit contract terms, rather than a legal rule such as those cited above 
related to good faith or abuse of rights. National law would enter the picture through the side 
door of an overarching applicable law clause, providing for contract interpretation according to 
principles found in the legal system of some ‘third country’ not that of either side to the contract, 
perceived as neutral between the parties (a traditional role for Swiss law) or perhaps especially 
developed in the substance of the contract (such as English law for maritime matter).  
Such arrangements can be found in price adjustment arbitrations related to long-term 
natural gas supply.60 The gas supply agreements attempt to provide a mechanism to address 
dramatic economic upheaval by permitting price adjustment for substantially changed 
circumstances.61 The contract might allow arbitrators to create a new price formula in light of 
                                                                                                                                                             
return the entirety of a customer’s funds. “My deposit was $1,500,” says the customer. “Ah, 
yes,” replies the banker. “But such dreary historical facts must yield to moral concerns for 
balance, symmetry and charity. We have rounded your account down to $1,000 and transferred 
the balance to a most deserving charity.”  
60 For a general description of the process, see e.g., Ben Holland & Phillip Spencer Ashley, 
‘Natural Gas Price Reviews: Past, Present and Future’, Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, 30 (No. 1), 2012, page 29; Marwan M. A. Musleh, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda in 
Gas Price Reviews’, presentation at International Bar Association, Boston, 9 October 2013. See 
also Richard Power, Gas price reviews: is arbitration the problem? Global Arbitration Review 8 
March 2014. Admitting the difficulty of any safe conclusion without seeing the agreements at 
issue in recent price adjustment arbitrations, the author nevertheless speculates that arbitrators 
may be abandoning proper contract construction, departing from links to oil prices in favor of 
gas spot prices.   
61 The adjustment clause might provide with a provision saying that arbitrators can review the 
Price Formula (usually a complex equation based on some index of energy values, already fixed 
in the agreement) to see whether that formula “needs to be revised to reflect significant changes 
in the buyer’s energy market which affect the value of gas in the buyer’s end user market, as 
such value can be obtained by a prudent and efficient gas company.” If the formula does need to 





changes affecting the value of gas obtained by a ‘prudent’ gas company so as to let the buyer 
market the gas ‘economically.’62  
Such adjustment clauses attempt to give contours to the ‘when, why and how’ of 
adjustment. The contract provisions aim to provide more specificity than the notion of pacta sunt 
servanda (‘agreements are to be kept’)63 borrowed from public international law, but interpreted 
in conjunction with the corollary principle clausula rebus sic stantibus, to the effect that the 
agreement is binding ‘so long as things stand as they are.’64 
On closer reflection, however, such price adjustment clauses may prove more malleable 
than initially expected, particularly if the buyer’s profit margin is considered.65 Does marketing 
‘economically’ mean to sell in a way that is ‘stingy’ and cheap? Or to market in a way that is 
economically sound? Either meaning might fit. 
Such price adjustment contracts will be subject to some applicable law, such as the law of 
England, Switzerland or New York. Perhaps that law will have something to say about how the 
                                                                                                                                                             
economically” (or “commercially” in some instances) under the assumption of “sound marketing 
practices by prudent and efficient operations on the part of Buyer.” 
62 For an instance when such a decision was challenged for excess of powers under Section 10 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, see Gas Natural Aprovisionamientos v. Atlantic LNG of Trinidad 
Tobago, 2008 WL 4344525 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
63 The essence of the concept appears in Justinian’s Code II.3.29 (chapter De Pactis): sancimus 
nemini licere adversus pacta sua venire et contrahentem decipere (“we shall not allow anyone to 
contravene his agreements and thereby disappoint (deceive) his contractor”).  
64 See e.g., Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th ed. 2003), at 591-92. The 
corollary, of course, is that treaties are binding “so long as things stand as they are” (the so-
called clausula rebus sic stantibus). See generally, J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (1963), 317-
345; F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law (1973), 327-359. 
65 Thus some observers challenge the utility of the notions ‘pact sunt servanda’ (contracts to be 
performed) and its corollary ‘rebus sic stantibus’ (assuming things remain the same), suggesting 




controverted words should be interpreted. In many instances, however, the choice of law clause, 
for an international arbitrator, will proves less useful than hoped.  
To explore why the law has its limits, one might recollect the old Latin maxim noscitur a 
sociis (‘a word is known by the company it keeps’). Context dictates meaning, with words taking 
a different sense from divergent sentences. Our feet run. Our noses run. One might see a run on 
the bank.66  
So the problem with national law as an interpretative tool (whether statute or case law) is 
that controverted terms arise in a domestic context different from the international circumstances 
facing the arbitrator. What is a ‘prudent’ gas company? The ‘prudent’ standard in national law 
might derive from cases regarding utility rates,67 determining fiduciary obligations for trustees, 
or making damage calculations in light of a duty to mitigate.68 
The quintessentially national context of most law can make national standards less than 
ideal for interpreting international agreements. For better or for worse, however, the arbitrator 
cannot just give up and say, “This is too hard for me!” Often, a search for the one good approach 
may need to be replaced by an identification of wrong paths to avoid. However, as Rudyard 
Kipling might have written, that is a story for another day. 
                                                 
66 Linguists sometimes describe phenomenon by word ‘polysemy’. If someone says “I get it” this 
might mean “I understand” or “I receive it” or “I buy it” or “I catch a disease.” 
67 Texas Public Utility Commission, Application of El Paso Electric Company for Authority to 
Change Rates, 10 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 1071, 1984 WL 274081 (Tex.P.U.C.) (Dec. 7, 1984) 
68 For example, New York courts have said that an injured party who makes an effort to avoid or 
reduce damages may be allowed to recover related expenses if the effort was made, inter alia, 
prudently and efficiently. Den Norske Ameriekalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing & 
Publishing Ass'n, 122 N.E. 463 (Mar. 4, 1919). Even in oil and gas leases, the word ‘prudent’ 
might change from one context to another, whether the operator’s drilling decisions, 
production operations, or marketing. See e.g., Gary B. Conine, ‘The Prudent Operator Standard: 




IV. More Shades of Gray: Choice of Law and Transnational Norms 
Choice of law problems pose special challenges for arbitral interpretation. National 
judges understandably take their starting point in the private international law principles of the 
forum.  However, an international arbitrator will often need to look elsewhere, since questions of 
applicable law often arise precisely because there is no obvious indication of which legal system 
(or systems) should govern the controverted question.   
The task becomes particularly vexing in deciding whether a non-signatory should be 
bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of some contract theory.69 When doubt has been 
raised about who agreed to arbitrate, arbitrators can face a ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum. The 
side arguing that an agreement exists might urge application of the governing law designated by 
the contract itself, even though that law was clearly not intended to govern relationships with 
strangers. In some instances, the right answer may depend on whether a signatory to an 
arbitration agreement seeks to enforce it against a non-signatory defendant, or whether an 
arguable outsider (the non-signatory) moves to compel arbitration against a signatory who has 
clearly agreed to arbitrate with a corporate affiliate of the claimant. 70 
                                                 
69 One well-known American case presented a litany of five theories for binding non-signatories: 
(i) incorporation by reference; (ii) assumption; (ii) agency; (iv) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (v) 
estoppel. Under the facts of the case, the court rejected each theory as insufficient to bind 
Thomson to the arbitration agreement of its subsidiary. See Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American 
Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir 1995). For a recent discussion of the agency theory 
in American jurisprudence, see Covington v. Aban Offshore Ltd., 650 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. Tex. 
2011). See generally William W. Park, ‘Non-signatories and International Contracts: An 
Arbitrator’s Dilemma’, in Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration 3 (PCA, 2009); 
William W. Park, ‘Rules and Standards in Private International Law’, Arbitration, 73, 2007, 
page 441.  
70 See also Fluor Daniel Intercontinental, Inc. v. GE., No. 98-Civ. 7181 (WHP), 1999 WL 
637236 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) where estoppel permitted a non-signatory respondent to benefit from an 




If a claimant wants to join to the arbitration an unwilling respondent on the basis of 
having agreed to arbitrate through a de facto or ostensible agency, the national judge will look to 
his or her lex fori for principles that suggest either when an agency might be found, or when a 
foreign law or agency should be taken into account.71 By contrast, a thoughtful arbitrator might 
find it difficult to determine agency by looking to the applicable law designated by the contract, 
or even the arbitral situs.  
If indeed the unwilling non-signatory respondent proves to be a stranger to the contract, 
then that person would not have agreed to either arbitration or the contract’s governing law. In 
such circumstances, an arbitrator who starts with the contract’s designated law risks presuming 
the conclusion, essentially pre-judging the question by taking the non-signatory as connected 
enough to come within the contractually-designated law, when as a matter of logic that is the 
precise point open to debate.72 Temping as it may be to simplify the decision-making process by 
looking to the contract, since that approach would treat the non-signatory a priori as having 
consented to application of the contract before that determination was in fact made. 
The point often escapes some of the sharpest thinkers, usually because of a tendency to 
assume that legal systems converge in their rules on agency, which of course represents another 
form of presuming the conclusion. If legal systems do not differ, then of course the choice of law 
problem does not arise. However, the need for some extra-contractual starting point becomes 
                                                 
71 Compare the French and British decisions in Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov’t of Pakistan: [2010] UKSC 46 and Cour d’appel [CA] de 
Paris, Case No. 09-28533, Feb. 17, 2011. Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention states that 
a recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if the arbitration agreement “is not 
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or of the country where the award was 
made.”   
72 Of course, the arbitrator might be quite sensitive to the law of the arbitral seat (and/or the place 





more vivid on positing a real conflict, with sharply differing legal systems. Imagine that chosen 
law of the contract, let us say the law of Ruritania, provides that wives and girlfriends will be 
bound by contracts concluded by their husbands and lovers. If the man in the relationship 
concludes a loan subject to the law of Ruritania, does that mean the woman will be bound to pay 
the debt, as well as to submit to arbitration on the matter? The question, of course, should be 
rhetorical.  
In consequence, arbitrators may base decisions about such matters on ‘transnational 
norms’ which become applicable through the practice of arbitral proceedings as well as so-called 
‘general principles of law.’73 Although such transnational norms might well derive from what 
French scholars term ‘un ordre juridique arbitral autonome,’74 the arbitrator often seeks to apply 
transnational norms not for reasons of ideology, but simply as a practical starting point for 
analysis in the absence of clearly applicable national law.  
V. Conclusion 
Do arbitrators apply national law differently from judges? The answer, unsatisfying to 
ideologues, and those hesitant to embrace uncertainty, must be ‘sometimes.’  
Although generalizations remain risky, judges and arbitrators diverge not so much due to 
any personality change that overcomes an individual wearing judicial robes, but rather from 
variations in the respective starting points for decision-making authority. Different departure 
                                                 
73 See Rhône Méditerranée v. Achille Lauro, 712 F. 2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983), validating an 
arbitration clause that contravened a provision of Italian law calling for an odd number of 
arbitrators even if the clause made provision for an umpire tie breaker. The court held that a 
commitment to arbitrate would be deemed “null and void” under the New York Convention only 
if defective by reason of “an internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud, or 
waiver” or when contrary to some fundamental policy of the forum state. 




points may yield different results, particularly with respect to contract terms that might appear at 
odds with applicable law. Judges normally take power from the political collectivity that makes 
their appointments and pays their salaries,75 whereas the arbitrator’s authority lies in an 
agreement to waive jurisdiction of otherwise competent courts.   
In an international contract, the primacy of the parties’ agreement may lead arbitrators to 
conclude that the litigants intended to invoke only part of a national legal system. By contrast, a 
judge may feel inclined to apply more broadly the norms of his or her own state, perhaps 
tweaked by an impulse to shape those norms to reflect the forum’s changing policy concerns.  
Thus arbitrators may sometimes show greater fidelity to the established rule of a chosen 
law, foregoing any policy-making function similar to that sometimes asserted by common law 
judges. In adjusting international contracts, arbitrators face special tensions in their search for 
equilibrium between rival notions of predictability, often expressed in imprecise terms like 
‘commercial reality’ or ‘strict letter of the law’ which like the humble chameleon take different 
colors depending on the backdrop. The ultimate stakes lie in arbitration’s ability to fill its 
promise in promoting the type of economic cooperation enhanced by reliable vindication of 
legitimate expectations. In the search for balance, common sense will likely pay far more 
dividends than ideology.    
                                                 
75 Even when judges look to court-selection clauses as the source of adjudicatory jurisdiction, 
such provisions must be given effect through the lens of the forum’s procedural law.  
